Asp police batons

Exercise Victory Strike II, a V Corps training event conducted in Poland during September and October 2001, deployed nearly 4,000 soldiers to two training areas. The available land and less stringent aviation restrictions made training with one of the newest members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization very attractive. V Corps exercised its rapid-deployment and deep-strike attack aviation capabilities, a rail deployment, and an air self-deployment while supporting two training areas that were 130 kilometers apart.

The implementing agreement between the Army and Poland set September 12th as the first day that U.S. troops would be allowed to enter Poland. To allow for a full day in Poland, the first V Corps soldiers deployed to a convoy support center just south of Berlin on the afternoon of September 11th. As they prepared to cross the German/Polish border early the next morning, terrorists were attacking the Pentagon and World Trade Center towers.

The commanders and their staffs recognized immediately that the force protection requirements for the deployed forces had changed with the terrorist attacks and grappled with the decision to continue, cancel, or adjust the deployment. After recalling the torch party and reevaluating the threat situation, V Corps's commander, in consultation with higher headquarters, gave the order to continue the deployment of forces.

The commanders were now faced with increased force protection requirements at their home stations and for the deployed forces--a post-September 11th mission analysis showed a clear need for additional force protection measures at all U.S. base camps and railheads. Although the main threat to U.S. interests was dangerous road conditions and pilferage attempts by local nationals, the staff could not discount the possibility of a transnational attack or a sympathy attack by factions within Poland. But force-protection-condition Charlie requirements and exercise strength-caps prevented V Corps from deploying forces that were significant to cover the additional requirements.

The Search for Solutions

A review of available combat power within the 18th MP Brigade revealed that although some additional forces could be deployed immediately, sending them to Poland would restrict V Corps's ability to react to other situations during the exercise. The 18th's decision not to deploy additional military police was validated a few weeks later when it was necessary to deploy an additional force within Germany for a new area security mission.

Another option considered was to reduce the mobile patrols and convoy escorts and use two platoons of military police from the 212th MP Company to bolster point security at high-value targets within V Corps's footprint. V Corps's plans staff realized quickly that stripping the military police of their inherent mobility during area-security missions would reduce the overall deployment force protection posture.

The V Corps staff and the 11th Aviation Regiment recognized that the highest-value target was clearly the almost 100 NATO helicopters on the ground at Poland's Ziemsko Airfield. In addition to the bulk of the 11th Aviation Regiment and the 12th Aviation Brigade, the airfield held nearly 40 aircraft from the Italian Furelli Brigade (Air Assault).

The aviation units were simply not staffed to secure the 8 kilometers of perimeter around the airfield properly. Although additional military police forces were not available within V Corps, a scout troop from the 1st Armored Division was available and tasked to deploy on short notice. Once on the ground, it was placed in a direct-support role to the airfield's base cluster commander. The scouts secured the backside of the airfield--a thick wood line that normally would have provided excellent dismounted avenues of approach--almost up to the flight line. Operating with their organic equipment, which is in many ways similar to an MP platoon, they employed both mounted and dismounted patrols, resulting in zero reports of airfield infiltration attempts. The scout troop and unit guards provided sufficient force protection--contract guards at the airfield were not required. This allowed the Corps to use contract guards at several other sites that would have had only unit guards.

A review of V Corps's use-of-force rules indicated that they were just as appropriate after 11 September as they were before. There was a renewed effort through the staff judge advocate (SJA) and command sergeant major channels to ensure that all soldiers were aware of the rules and knew how to employ deadly force. The SJA trained V Corps's non-military police after a decision was made to arm additional force protection guards throughout the exercise area.

Doctrinal Answers

The solutions to these questions were contained within the framework of current military police doctrine. It describes base/base cluster security and commanders' responsibilities (military police also provide support outside the base perimeter). Commanders may assign combat forces to protect critical bases/base clusters. Host-nation assets--whether civilian police, civilian security guards, or military units--are also essential in many parts of the globe where the United States envisions sending troops. Doctrine recognizes that any single measure, when used alone, is almost never the best method that can be used to secure an asset. Thus, normal physical security measures (including barriers and fencing) were a key part of the exercise's force protection equation.

Contract Security Guards

The exercise's original security plan called for contract security guards to be at the railheads only during deployment and redeployment; their mission was to control curious onlookers and prevent petty theft. The provost marshal expanded the guards' role, increasing the time that they were to work and the number of guard posts. Unfortunately, the original contract was with a local company that had difficulty providing all the additional guards required for the new, expanded mission.

A specific mission analysis on the use of the contract guards identified a number of questions that had to be answered before they could begin work: * Should the guards be armed?

* What were their rules on the use of deadly force?

* Would it be sensible to change their use-of-force rules to mirror V Corps's? How could that be accomplished?

* Who would serve as the contracting officer's representative?

* What were the guards' training standards?

* How flexible were the contract companies? Would they be able to deal with frequent changes during the exercise's deployment and redeployment phases as railheads and bases shut down or expanded?

* Did any of the guards speak English? How many translators would be available?

* How many companies would be available to bid on the contract? Could the Corps conduct any "comparison shopping," or would it be restricted to just one provider?

The most critical of these questions was the use of deadly force and whether or not armed guards were required. Initially, the military police were the only soldiers who would be carrying live ammunition daily. The 11 September attacks resulted in all force protection guards carrying ammunition, allowing V Corps to hire unarmed security guards.

The rules of engagement for the armed security guards were reviewed. Polish law allows for a fairly low threshold for the use of deadly force. A properly bonded security guard is allowed to employ deadly force to prevent the theft of any property he is guarding. Those rules allow a Polish security guard to use deadly force to prevent the theft of a case of MREs or a soldier's rucksack. Those standards are generally outside the Army's rules for the use of force; therefore, the rules for the security guards were modified to mirror the Corps's.

A contractor was able to provide armed security guards on very short notice but at a substantially higher cost. That contract was signed for only one week due to the availability of funds. During the time this contract was in effect, the contracting office found another contractor capable of providing security guards--armed with stun guns and batons--at a much lower cost. Those guards were also employed for the duration of the exercise. V Corps now had two contracts: one providing armed security guards and the other unarmed security guards. Although a single contract for all security guards was preferred, that was simply not available. The critical question then became how to deploy these two separate forces.